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PRACTICING "IN THE INTERESTS OF
JUSTICE" IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
PURSUING PEACE AS JUSTICE
CarrieMenkel-Meadow*
"The core mission of the legal profession is the pursuit of justice,

through the resolution of conflict or the orderly and civilized rightingof
wrongs.II1

When I was a young law student, then a legal services attorney and
finally a clinical law teacher, practicing "in the interests of justice"

often meant either winning a legal case for a particular disadvantaged
person or moving a legal precedent once inch forward in a larger law

reform campaign for a cause.

Justice--whatever

it means

* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Director, GeorgetownHewlett Program in Conflict Resolution and Problem Solving. Thanks to my research
assistant and student, who is also my teacher, Joshua Eizen.
A good portion of this essay was written just before September 11, 2001, and
the rest of it was completed afterward. I have begun to think that all "texts" will
suffer from a new "deconstructive" and interpretative frame-things written before
and after 9/11/01. To call for problem solving and peacemaking in lawyering here
seems to heighten this interpretative issue of when fights, wars and resistance are
important and when peace and more conciliatory problem solving are appropriate. I
hope that as these events scar us and rearrange the salient "memes" in our heads we
will continue to explore the complexities of analyzing responses to different kinds of
conflicts, disputes and problems in the world. On the one hand, internal, domestic
legal disputes are different from international conflict and terrorism. On the other
hand, since I believe we are now fighting our first "post-modern" war in which nationstates and clear "adversaries" are not coherent but more multi-national and "viral,"
the powerful memes and metaphors we use to try to understand what has happened
and what should happen will likely "spill over" into many different areas. (Are we to
appreciate our "oneness" with our fellow sufferers and citizens or be ever "alert" to
the possible "treason" of a seemingly peaceful member of our community?)
As a Manhattan-born New York native and current citizen of the nation's
capital, I dedicate this article to the victims, rescuers, family members and all of us
who have suffered from the extreme and painful conflict and damage visited upon us
by the terrorists. I continue to dedicate my professional life to the hope that we can
still create a world which is both peaceful and just.
1. Howard Gardner et al., Good Work: When Excellence and Ethics Meet 10
(2001).
2 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward An
Understandingof the Motivation and Conmitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in Cause
Lawyering: Political Commitments and Professional Responsibilities 31 (Austin Sarat
& Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 1998).

1761

1762

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

philosophically and practically-was tied expressly to law: legal cases
and precedents, statutes and regulations. In other words, the purpose
of practice was to achieve some sense of righteous equity in human
conditions through the use of law and legal rights.
Early in my own practice I saw that legal victories were often
Pyrrhic-the particular legal battle might easily be won (such as in a
summary
judgment
declaring
some
institutional
practice
discriminatory, ultra vires or unconstitutional and, therefore, void) but
the underlying social, economic or political relations between the
parties would not change substantially. I learned this lesson in my
own practice through cases brought against welfare departments,
educational systems, prisons and employers. Somewhat ironically,
lawsuits against public and state agencies were easier to win, in large
measure because the state action doctrine of the early 1970s made
applicability of a variety of constitutional and federal legislation
principles more stringent against public entities than against private
actors.' I say ironically, because, even then, I thought that most
private actors (large private corporations, small minded "small
businesses," private landlords, private schools and family members)
were often responsible for far more economic, social and political
harm to people suffering from "injustice" than public institutions
where enforcement of public norms was more likely to be selfexecuting. Now, with the sophistication of a social scientist, I know
that this is a complicated empirical question. Different sectors of the
economy and society are more or less likely to be committed to social
justice than the simple "public-private" dichotomy predicts or
explains. And, clearly, different segments of both the public and
private spheres have been differentially compliant with and sensitive
to legal changes mandated by statutes, regulations and lawsuits.
What I did learn from my early years of law practice was that
compliance with legal mandates was variable (I know this also as a law
and society scholar)4 and did not necessarily mean that "justice" had
been achieved. Legal philosophers continue to debate and discuss
whether legal justice is coterminous with social justice or morality;5
social scientists attempt to study and explain what the acted-upon

3. See Symposium, The PublicdPrivate Distinction, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1289
(1982).
4. For a discussion of studies of legal compliance with regulatory law, see Keith
Hawkins & John M. Thomas, Enforcing Regulation (1984). For a discussion of so
called "gap studies," which examine the differences between "law on the books" and
"law in action," see Richard L. Abel, Law Books and Books About Law, 26 Stan. L.
Rev. 175 (1973) (reviewing Max Rheinstein, Marriage Stability, Divorce and the Law

(1972)).
5. See, e.g., Ronald M. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977); Lon L. Fuller,
The Morality of Law (1964); H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961); David Luban,
Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (1988); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice
(1971).
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consider as felt or experienced "justice"; 6 and practicing lawyers
continue to appeal for justice as a core value of the legal system-to
urge legal decision makers to grant them what they want. Indeed,
justice, it is often claimed, emerges only when lawyers and their clients
argue over its meaning and, in turn, some authoritative figure or body
pronounces on its meaning, such as in the canonical cases of the late
twentieth century, Brown v. Board of Education7 and Roe v. Wade.8
For many years now, I have suggested that there are other
components to the achievement of justice. Most notably, I refer to the
process by which we seek justice (party participation and
empowerment, consensus rather than compromise or command)9 and

the particular types of outcomes that might help to achieve it (not
binary win-lose solutions, but creative, pie-expanding or even shared
solutions). 10 Without recounting here the full arguments made about
the advantages and disadvantages of "alternative" (I now say
"appropriate") dispute resolution, it is clear that many advocates of
"justice" think that, by and large, more "consensually" based legal
processes are inadequate to achieve their versions of social justice."1
Indeed, one well-known critic has accused these processes of
developing a "harmony" ideology which is antithetical to the
achievement of some forms of social and legal justice."2
In these comments I suggest that in our current world, both
international and domestic, practicing "in the interests of justice"
includes-indeed, should give great priority to-the "peace-seeking"
and "problem solving" aspects of lawyering. I continue to see this as
counter-cultural to the more common practices of lawyers who are
argumentative, persuasive and articulate debaters, who believe
fervently and vigorously that seeking justice, on behalf of a client or
cause, means advocating for and "winning" a legal claim. To the
contrary, seeking peace for parties (and, indeed, nation-states) in
conflict, searching for consensus solutions to seemingly intractable
public policy and legal disputes and creatively negotiating new
relationships, transactions, partnerships and entities are all, for me,

6. See, e.g., Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, The Common Place of Law. Stories
From Everyday Life (1998); E. Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of

Procedural Justice (1988); Tom Tyler et al., Social Justice in a Diverse Society (1997).
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem-Solving,31 UCLA L. Rev. 754 (1984).
10. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possiblein Legal ProblemSolving
and Teachablein Legal Education?,6 Harv. Negot. L Rev. 97 (2001).
11. This, in my view, includes Deborah Rhode's treatment of the issue in In The
Interests of Justice:Reforming the Legal Profession131-35 (2000).
12. Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and
Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 Ohio St. J. on Disp.
Resol. 1 (1993).
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essential parts of practicing "in the interests of justice." I will try to
elaborate why I think so, briefly, here.
In a recent address to another law school in this city, former
President Clinton, upon accepting the Second Annual Cardozo
International Advocate for Peace Award, said, "Throughout human
history, tragically, we have seen more advances in tools for waging
war than in the art of making peace."13 That comment, while certainly
true of human behavior in general, is applicable to legal behavior as
well. We have developed more and more sophisticated forms of legal
warfare (discovery and the paper wars of attrition, and, my personal
favorite, the recent ad of the Los Angeles Intercontinental Hotel for a
"litigation war room" available for lawyers planning strategy, taking
depositions and developing their "battle plans," all in facilities with
completely up-to-date technology and "close to the battlefield"- the
courthouse). 4 Fortunately, I think we have also seen some advances
in developing some tools for "making peace" with the proliferation of16
mediation,'15 problem solving and interest-based negotiation,
negotiated rule-making 17 and a variety of consensus building
processes,'18 as well as problem-solving courts in a variety of
substantive areas. 19 These new tools are intended, in my view, to seek
peace and justice simultaneously through the use of a variety of
different forms of dialogue, policy-making, rule development, dispute
settlement and conflict management. As I now tell my colleagues in a
variety of substantive areas, if we cannot make enough peace and
quiet to have a reasonable dialogue with each other (see by contrast
the continuing violence in the troubled spots of the world) we will not
be able to seek justice, let alone substantive solutions to any of our
13. William Jefferson Clinton, Address on the Occasion of the Second Annual

International Advocate for Peace Award, Mar. 19, 2001, Cardozo Online Journal of
Conflict Resolution, at http://www.cordozo.yu.edulcojcr/final%5Fsite/iapFaward/
2001/clintontrans.htm.
14. Intercontinental Hotel advertisement in National Law Journal, Nat'l L. J.,
April 10, 2000, at A8.
15. Mediation: Theory, Policy and Practice (Carrie Menkel-Meadow ed., 2001)
[hereinafter Mediation].

16. Roger Fisher et al., Getting to YES: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving
In (2nd ed. 1991); Robert H. Mnookin, et al., Beyond Winning: Negotiating to Create

Value in Deals and Disputes (2000).
17. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1997); Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for the
Malaise, 71 Geo. L.J. 1 (1982); cf.Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise
and Performanceof NegotiatedRulemaking, 46 Duke L. J. 1255 (1997).
18. Susan L. Carpenter & W.J.D. Kennedy, Managing Public Disputes (2nd ed.
2001); Lawrence Susskind et al., The Consensus Building Handbook (1999).
19. Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer,23
Law & Pol'y 125 (2001); Michael Dorf & Charles Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and
Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 831 (2000); Judith Kaye,
Changing Courts in Changing Times: The Need for a Fresh Look at How Courts Are
Run, 48 Hastings L.J. 851 (1997).
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problems. 20 Peace, of at least some minimal sort, is a prerequisite to
the search for justice. 21 And to the extent that peace-seeking tools are
part of what I would call "process consciousness," lawyers should be
-but are not yet, by disposition or training-at the forefront of
practicing justice by considering and shaping processes that are more
likely to lead to peaceful and better outcomes. 2
I.

FIRST PRINCIPLES

"The pursuit of justice" is one of those legal tropes or mantras that
we often invoke to describe the mission of our profession. Much
philosophical ink has been spilled on the subject of what justice
consists of, in its various forms: distributive, equitable, principled.
When the pursuit of justice is linked to the practice of law at least
three other foundational values are often similarly declaimed: justice
through the "rule of law, not men, ".equal access to justice" (and
"equality before the law") and the importance of "fair process" in
achieving justice.
While others are busily re-examining the meaning of the "rule of
law" limitation on the rule of men 2 (it is, after all, men and women,
these days, who make, enforce, interpret, break or ignore the law), the
"rule of law" has for some time now been criticized as the best or even
the only way to achieve justice. 25 As some Critical Legal Studies
scholars argued years ago, a reliance on legal rights, whether in the
enforcement of "old" laws or in the "creation" of new laws or rights
was likely to be inadequate, and in some cases, positively
counterproductive to the achievement of a deeper and more far20. This principle is embodied in the Mitchell Report. Report of the Sharm ElSheikh Fact-Finding Committee (Mitchell Report) (April 30, 2001), http:/lusinfo.
state.gov/regional/nea/mitchell.htm (get the parties to talk, build confidence and trust

slowly to build more substantive solutions). The Mitchell principles, suggested for
Mid-east peace talks, are derived, in part, from Mitchell's experience as mediator in
the Northern Ireland peace process. See George J. Mitchell, Making Peace (1999).
21. There is of course a long and powerful tradition of violent revolutions seeking
social justice, see Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (Rev. ed. 1965), and

also a strong tradition of non-violent passive resistance in social justice movements.
See, eg., Peter Ackerman & Jack DuVall, A Force More Powerful: A Century of
Nonviolent Conflict (2000); Paul Erenst Wehr et al., Justice Without Violence (1994);
Martin Luther King, Jr. Letter From a Birmingham Jail (April 16, 1963).
22. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer's Role in Deliberative Democracy (2001)

(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
23. This raises interesting questions about who defines the mission of a profession,
those inside, or emic versions as anthropologists would describe it, or those outside

(etic versions). How would those served by lawyers (clients or "the public") describe
our mission? (Perhaps to right wrongs or win cases but probably less often to "pursue

justice.")
24. See, eg., Robin West, Rethinking the Rule of Law (2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
25. The quote that appears on the edifice of the Edward Bennett Williams Law
Library (attributed to a Georgetown student) is "Justice is the end, law is the means."
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reaching social justice. Whether in the reliance on the state to
recognize or enforce laws and rights, or in the alienation that is
derived from the "abstractions" of law and legal principles or in the
focus on individual, rather than collectivized, rights holders and
enforcers, the equation of legal rights with justice seemed hollow (in
the 1980s at least) to many legal theorists and progressive activists.26
Enforcement and creation of legal rights depends, in large measure,
on using the apparatus of the legal system (courts, legislatures and
administrative agencies) and all too often, as Deborah Rhode's work
has demonstrated,2 7 on the apparatchiks of the system-legal
professionals.
Thus, whether through arcane principles (laws,
arguments, rules) or processes (litigation, rule-making, lobbying) the
pursuit of justice has become "over-professionalized" and inaccessible
to many within a self-proclaiming successful democracy.
My own work has been focused on how little legal endowments or
remedies may actually address what parties to legal disputes or
conflicts actually desire or need.' In short, I might ask-is "legal
justice" (conformity to legal rules, principles and remedies) the same
thing as "social" or even "individual justice"? When might parties
engaged with each other (whether in disputatious or other contexts)
desire things that are neither legally prescribed nor proscribed?
For other critics, American justice has been overly concerned with
procedure or process, whether in the arcane arrangements of
governance structure provided by the Constitution or in the more
multi-layered process jurisprudence of the legal process school
exemplified by Lon Fuller and others. More recently, the British
social philosopher, Stuart Hampshire, long concerned with substantive
justice issues, has opined that since we will never reach agreement on
the substantive good in a modern (and post-modern) multiply plural
world, the best we can hope for is agreement about the search for the
just and fair through a common procedural understanding of audi
alteran partem, or "hear the other side." Hampshire makes a claim
for the justice of the adversary system as perhaps Western
civilization's greatest achievement. While I mostly agree with
Hampshire's focus on procedural justice, I want to suggest here, as
elsewhere,2 9 that his view of the effectiveness of adversarial argument
for achieving justice ("justice is conflict") is too narrow and crabbed.
Perhaps my version of his argument would be "conflict is justice,"
only if we recognize that: 1) "conflict" or arguments exist in more
26. See, e.g., Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the
Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1563 (1984); Peter Gabel & Duncan
Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1984); Mark Tushnet, An Essay
on Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363 (1984).
27. Rhode, supra note 11, at 135-41.
28. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 10.
29. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 22.
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than polarized, binary forms (there are many "sides" to a conflict so
we will have to hear more than "both sides"); 2) the processes or
forms of "conflict handling" (not resolution) need not be exclusively
"adversarial"; and 3) in those other "conflict resolving" processes we
seek to achieve "peaceful" coexistence, mutual understanding and
justice simultaneously. 30
Thus, for me, first principles about the pursuit of justice suggest that
there are both substantive and procedural dimensions to justice and
that "legal justice" may not be capacious enough to include all that I
would consider just. In the remaining pages of this essay, I want to
suggest that it is not enough to "reform the legal profession" from
within conventional, limited and stilted conceptions of "legal justice"
or professional responsibility reforms. Because I believe justice is
bigger and more complex than both "legal justice" and legal ethics,
and includes a set of values in addition to those commonly associated
with legal justice, the lawyer's role in "pursuing justice" must expand
to pursuing other forms of actions-including peace-seeking,
consensus-building and problem-solving, as well as our more
conventional roles of advocacy and representation. Here I will briefly
explore two different fora where lawyers might perform such work:
with clients in concrete legal disputes and with larger social groups
that seek to resolve social, political and even international policy
issues.
II. "PEACE WORK" AND PROBLEM SOLVING WITH CLIENTS
In their recent book exploring the content of "good work," social,
cognitive and developmental psychologists Howard Gardner, Mihaly
Csikszentmihalyi, and William Damon explore the dimensions of
professions that "align" their mission, standards, practices, identities
and ethics. 31 Though the authors do not focus on the legal
profession,32 they do specify the mission of the legal profession as "the
30. This is the part that gets harder after 9/11/01. Is "mutual understanding"
always possible? Desirable? Are there moral absolutes that prevent "peaceful
coexistence" in some arenas? Note how quickly our leadership fell into the
conventional American adversarial "trap" by totally demonizing "the evil ones." At
the other extreme, life-long peace activists sought rational messages and connections
in the actions of the terrorists (world distributional inequalities, connections to antiglobalists in World Trade disputes and protests) that also, in my view, simplify the
"conflict."
31. Howard Gardner et al., supra note 1.
32. They examine one profession that is in alignment-genetics-and one that is
not-journalism. The legal profession can find itself by analogy easily in the same
challenges facing journalism: increased focus on market and "bottom line" values,
changing technologies and "speed-up" of information processing, control by others
over work with loss of professional autonomy, less than adequate mentoring and rolemodeling, extensive rewards for status, wealth and celebrity in what is supposed to be
an intrinsically valuble "cerebral" profession and increased competition with new
entrants to the field. Id. at 125-206.
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pursuit of justice through the resolution of conflict [or the civil
righting of wrongs]." While most who praise the work of lawyers as
justice seekers tend to focus on the latter ("righting of wrongs"
through litigation or legislation), others of us have suggested for about
twenty years or more that the pursuit of justice may also be served by
the resolution of conflicts, whether between individuals, between
individuals and either public or private institutions, or even between
two or more institutions. Thus, while the default assumption about
the work of lawyers is adversary representation, 33 mediators and other
lawyer-conflict resolvers have identified themselves as "alternative" to
both conceptions: "representation" and "adversarial."' For these
lawyers (and a new group called "collaborative" lawyers 35 ) the lawyer
pursues justice by "seeking to reorient the parties to each other"3 6 (in
both relationship-enhancing and substantive terms).
The work of the lawyer as a conflict resolver is to explore not only
legal, but also other needs and interests of the parties (including
economic, social, psychological, political, religious, moral and ethical
concerns). Utilizing theories, not only of law, but of human behavior
(sociology, psychology and economics), lawyers as conflict
professionals look for situations where these diverse needs and
interests do not compete with each other (the assumption of the legal
system that "money is proxy" for all other, often non-economic,
interests) but complement each other (the "Homans principle").37
Complementary needs permit "efficient trades" (Pareto-optimal in
economic parlance) or "log-rolling" (in the language of political
scientists)-positive-sum, rather than zero-sum results. Thus, at the
level of substantive problem solving, lawyers seeking to achieve both
maximum gain for individual clients and joint gain for all involved in a
particular situation, must employ different kinds of cognitive
processes and different technologies and techniques in order to
fashion good and lasting solutions to disputes and conflicts. At the
relational level, where legal disputes and conflicts either begin with or
accumulate a large emotional "residue" of resentment, anger and a
sense of injustice, (and, therefore, demand for both compensation and
33. See, e.g., David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive
Public Interest Lawyers, Legal Affairs (forthcoming 2002).
34. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in NonadversarialLawyering, 27 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 153 (1999); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The
Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-PartyNeutral: Creativity and Non-Partisanship
in Lawyering, 72 Temple L. Rev. 785 (1999).
35. Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law (2001); Robert W. Rack, Jr., Settle or
Withdraw: Collaborative Lawyering Provides Incentive to Avoid Costly Litigation,
Disp. Resol. Magazine, Summer 1998, at 8.
36. Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 305

(1971).
37. Named for the sociologist George Homans who noted the complementarity of
human needs (after basic Maslovian survival needs are met). George Caspar Homans,
Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms (Rev. ed. 1974).
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retribution), skilled lawyers as peace-makers must develop different
kinds of communication skills than the traditional forms of argument,
debate and adversarial claiming.-'s
Lawyers interested in pursuing "resolution of human problems" as
a dimension of justice (beyond the winning of a legal case) can
perform such roles in different ways. Not all pursuers of justice in
individual cases are mediators. Serving as the "representative"
(restoring one of the lawyer's more conventional roles) in a
mediation, a lawyer may still serve a client who needs assistance in
stating a claim or articulating a need or interest, but will also have to
develop a different mind-set of approaching the other side and
seeking creative (perhaps beyond precedent and boilerplate) solutions
to problems.3 9 For the jurisprudentially sensitive lawyer-conflict
resolver, the question of justice in a mediative setting may be framed
by asking the parties to reflect on what is "fair" to them. In the words
of my friend and mediator-collaborator, Gary Friedman, "law may be
relevant, but not determinative"' of what is fair to each party. From
a Legal Realist perspective, it may be useful to remember that
legislatures write laws for the general good (seeking the "golden
mean" of regulation for the majority of actors). The general law may
not serve "justice" in an individual case and so, as long as not
otherwise unlawful, individual or party-tailored solutions to legal
disputes or problems may depart from particular legal formulations.4
Legal or "legislated justice" may not always be the same as personal
or social justice between parties. Consider as examples: mutually
agreed to departures from court-suggested spousal and child support
guidelines, departures from sentencing guidelines, liquidated damages
clauses in contracts and all future-oriented solutions to disrupted past
dealings in both business and personal relationships 2 Lawyers
seeking this kind of "individual" justice between parties (where no
important public issue demands transparency or where the parties
prefer a highly individualized and flexible, future-oriented solution to
their problem) seek both a better quality solution and a more lasting

38. See, e.g., Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, The Promise of

Mediation (1994); Douglas Stone et al., Difficult Conversations: How To Discuss
What Matters Most (1999).
39. See Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using
Economics and Psychology to Stncture Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14
Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 269 (1999).
40. Gary Friedman & Jack Himmelstein, Center for Mediation in Law, Training
Materials, The Place of Law in Mediation (2001).
41. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Winning Isn't Everything: The Lawyer as
Problem Solver, 28 Hofstra L. Rev. 905 (2000).

42. For a true to life example of how a complex and highly contested legal dispute
was transformed into a joint venture see the description of the Digital vs. Intel patent

infringement litigation in Mnookin et al., supra note 16, at 243-48.

1770

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

"peace" between the parties43 than a "command" order of court is
likely to accomplish. 4
This is not to say that all "alternative dispute resolution" is
necessarily more individually just than traditional litigation. Indeed, I
have been critical of very problematic distortions of the "ADR"
process that inhibit several important justice values: access to justice
and fairness, particularly in the form of mandatory arbitration clauses
in a variety of settings, ranging from employment to consumer
contracts to health care,45 which remove process choice, may be
prohibitively costly and provide inadequate representation and
remedies to harmed individuals. Claims about the fairness and
"justice" of all forms of process must be considered both for what they
promise and do internally, as well as in relation to what else is
available-"the baseline" problem in evaluating relative fairness of
legal processes to each other. The best and worst of different
processes should not be compared to each other but best to best and
worst to worst of each process. Ideally, we should be able to measure
differences and understand the reasons for when and how justice is
delivered in different settings (and sometimes differentially for
different people).46
III. "SOCIAL WORK" AND PROBLEM SOLVING IN THE POLITY

There are those who continue to question both the efficacy 7 and
the legitimacy 4s of privatized peacemaking in all lawyer directed
43. Indeed, one group of legal mediators has disclaimed any need to "resolve"
disputes or make settlements, but instead seeks to enhance human understanding
through "recognition and empowerment" whether or not an actual agreement is
reached. See Bush & Folger, supra note 38. For my critique of this "either-or"
approach to the mission and goals of legal mediation, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
The Many Ways of Mediation: The Transformation of Traditions, Ideologies,
ParadigmsandPractices,11 Negot. J. 217 (1995).
44. For examples of many studies documenting the greater efficacy and
enforcement rates of mediated solutions to court ordered solutions in a variety of
contexts, see Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in
Maine: An EmpiricalAssessment, 33 Me. L. Rev. 237 (1981), Jessica Pearson & Nancy
Thoennes, Final Report of the Divorce Mediation Research Project (1984), and, more
recently, Craig A. McEwen, Managing CorporateDisputing: Overcoming Barriers to
the Effective Use of Mediationfor Reducing the Cost and Time of Litigation, 14 Ohio
St. J. on Disp. Resol. 1 (1998).
45. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead in Alternative
Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 Ohio J. on Disp. Resol. 19 (1999);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of
Innovation Co-optedof "The Law of ADR", 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1 (1991).
46. Not all parties want public hearings. My work in women's health cases
demonstrates that some individuals actually prefer private justice. See Carrie MenkelMeadow, Taking the Mass Out of Mass Torts: Reflections of a Dalkon Shield
Arbitrator on Alternative Dispute Resolution, Judging, Neutrality, Gender, and
Process,31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 513 (1998).
47. See, e.g., James S. Kakalik et al., An Evaluation of Mediation and Early
Neutral Evaluation Under the Civil Justice Reform Act (1996); James S. Kakalik et
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mediation. If all "justice" is to be pursued in public settings with
transparency for all affected (going beyond those in the dispute, to
include all those who might be affected by it), 9 there are also different
roles for lawyers to play in achieving not only peace and justice, but
greater legitimacy with respect to results. Without recounting it fully
here, a new body of legal theory has developed around the application
of such political theories as Habermas's "ideal speech conditions"o
and new models of "deliberative democracy""1 to provide the
foundational underpinnings for a different form of legal practice
which seeks to "pursue justice" with different processes. By
expanding mediational, problem solving concepts to the development
of new processes and institutions, lawyers and other public policy
advocates have been engaged for some time now in the pursuit of new
forms of law-making, decision-making, community and participatory
democracy. Whether called "consensus building fora," negotiated
rule-makings ("reg-neg") or public dispute management events, new
fora have developed to respond to a host of legal and political
conflicts including environmental siting, regulation drafting, budget
allocation, international treaties, municipal governance, and
community and diversity disputes. These new forms of action seek to
achieve "just," as well as more peaceful, less acrimonious and more
lasting solutions to multi-faceted problems by employing processes
that differ considerably from the conventional ways in which lawyers
seek to pursue justice.
Recognizing that most modern legal and social disputes engage
more than two parties, such processes require conflict assessment and
invitations for participation by a multiplicity of "stakeholders" to a
problem, including representatives of such non-litigants as "future
generations," potentially affected parties and others who might not
al., Just, Speedy and Inexpensive? An Evaluation of Judicial Case Management

Under the Civil Justice Reform Act (1996); Donna Stienstra et al., Report to the
Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case Management: A
Study of the Five Demonstration Programs Established Under the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990 (1997); Elizabeth Plapinger, RAND Study of Civil Justice Reform
Act Sparks Debate, Nat'l L. J. Mar. 24,1997 at B-18.
48. See, eg., Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073 (1984); David

Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of te Public Realm, 83 Geo. L.J. 2619 (1995). Of
course, those who continue to fault "private settlements" continue to assume that
courts consider public consequences, even in private disputes that are litigated,
despite the fact that courts continue to claim that "policy making" is for legislatures
and not for the courts and despite the fact that standing and other doctrines have
severely limited what "public" issues may even be litigated.
49. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical

and DemocraticDefense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 Geo. L.J. 2663 (1995).
50. Jurgen Habermas, A Theory of Communicative Action (Thomas McCarthy

trans., 1984); Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a
Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (William Rehg trans., 1996).
51. Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267 (1998).
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have conventional "standing" in a lawsuit. Although "facilitated" by
some kind of neutral process expert (an ideal role for a procedureminded lawyer), typically such processes involve the parties
themselves in setting the rules of process and decision.
Such
democracy in action must confront whether unanimity, supermajorities or other forms of "consensus" decision rules will govern,
but the parties make decisions themselves about how they will resolve
a contested matter. With rules for shared speaking and a focus on
"interests" or "needs" rather than positions, parties, as well as their
representatives and lawyers, directly participate in such processes.
After airing grievances and listing agenda items, such groups often
move into guided exercises based on brainstorming, problem-solving,
and tasks that facilitate solutions to resource and value conflicts and
dilemmas that come from the parties themselves, rather than from an
outsider. (In some variations of these processes, mediators can be
asked to turn into evaluators or arbitrators or expertise can be
marshaled either in the form of providing information or rendering a
decision, but the choice to do this resides with the parties.) While
these processes certainly have their critics and detractors too,53 their
procedures are increasingly being applied to a wide variety of social,
legal and political problems.' beyond American domestic concerns
and into the international arena, including such issues as deteriorating
adversarialism in Congress,55 and global warming and international
environmental accords. 5 6 Even new courts have borrowed from the
conceptual base of this multi-partied, multi-issue focus on problem
solving. Drug courts, integrated family courts, community courts and
"'vice" courts now seek multi-faceted solutions to solving the
"underlying problems" that often present themselves as single issues
or disputes in a criminal court (addiction, lack of resources and social
services). These courts, which attempt to focus on the "whole person"
and also combine punishment with efforts at rehabilitation, certainly
have their critics among the more adversarially minded criminal
defense lawyers and prosecutors,5 7 to whom individuals must concede
52. For one thoughtful summary of such ground rules, designed to replace
Robert's Rules of Order, see Susskind, supra note 18 at 3-57.
53. See, e.g., Coglianese, supra note 17.
54. Lawrence Susskind & Liora Zion, Strengthening the Democratic Process in
the United States: An Examination of Recent Experiments (2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
55. See Richard Gephart describing his role as House Minority Leader by saying:
"Our job is to resolve conflict, knowing that the conflict will never truly be resolved."
Roll Call, Mar. 6, 1997 (commenting on "harmony" retreats in Hershey,
Pennsylvania).
56. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, opened for signature, Mar. 16, 1998, available at http://www.unfccc.intresource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
57. See, e.g., Anthony C. Thompson, Courting Disorder: Some Thoughts on
Problem Solving Courts, 10 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y (forthcoming 2002).
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"guilt" before they can receive treatment (derived from the principles
of the earlier restorative justice movement).58
Lawyers, as I have argued at greater length elsewhere, 59 may be
particularly well suited to participating in these new processes.
Lawyers have "process consciousness." Aware of procedural rules
and concerned about "voice" and procedural fairness, with proper
training (facilitation is quite different from argumentation), lawyers
may make ideal process leaders of these new processes and
institutions.
To the extent that efforts at collaboration and
community and democratic decision making still implicate legal
requirements (siting disputes require zoning and environmental
approvals from formal legal authorities), lawyers are well suited to
spot the legal issues and provide for their appropriate coordination
with less formal processes. To the extent that these new processes are
experiments in constitution-making (as some legal scholars have
named them)60 or simply more direct democratic enterprises than
local and national and international government is accustomed to,
law-trained individuals may be particularly well suited to serving in
these processes, whether as "neutral-facilitators" or advocates or
party representatives.
These new roles put lawyers in perhaps unfamiliar ways of
functioning as they pursue justice. Focused not just on "winning" the
case, but on meeting the needs of multiple sets of parties and affected
third parties, and on looking for substantive solutions that will require
marshaling new resources, drafting new regulations, creating new
institutions (including public and private partnerships in some cases)
and implementing and enforcing plans, lawyers will have to learn new
skills and develop new conceptual frameworks. It will not be easy to
do all of this, particularly in light of robust conventional frames and
conceptual models through which we process the world, and because
our system is more than several centuries old. But, if I can take
anything useful out of the recent events that have hurt us so badly, it is
clear we are living in a new world with new problems that will require
new forms of processes and solutions if we are to achieve a peaceful
and just world. If necessity is the mother of invention, we are
certainly in need of the birth of some new ideas for pursuing justice,
both at home and in the larger world we now all inhabit.
Conventional approaches to pursuing "justice" like our
"conventional" approaches of military solutions to international
problems may destroy the very "res" we are fighting about.
5& See David Lernan, Restoring Justice, 14 Tikkun 13 (1999); Mark Umbreit,
Mediation of Victim Offender Conflict, 1988 Mo. J. Disp. Res. 85. For an account of
different remedial philosophies in criminal sentencing, see Pamela Utz, Settling the
Facts (1978).
59. See Mediation, supra note 15.
60. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 51.
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(Producing a "negative sum" game in negotiation parlance). Just as
military solutions to "war" may not bring us peace, an exclusive focus
on "legal" needs and interests may not bring us justice. This is true,
whether we like it or not.

